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Social Choice or Collective Decision-making: What Is Politics All About?1 





Abstract: Sometimes citizens disagree about political matters, but a decision must be made.  We 
have two theoretical frameworks for resolving political disagreement.  The first is the framework 
of social choice.  In it, our goal is to treat parties to the dispute fairly, and there is no sense in 
which some are right and the others wrong.  The second framework is that of collective decision-
making.  Here, we do believe that preferences are truth-apt, and our moral consideration is owed 
not to those who disagree, but to the community that stands to benefit or suffer from their 
decision.  In this essay, I consider whether political disagreements are conflicts between 
incommensurable values or imperfections in our collective search for truth.  I conclude two 
things.  First, analysis of real-world disagreement suggests that collective decision-making is the 
right way to model politics.  In most, possibly even all, political disagreements, all parties 
believe, if implicitly, that there is an objective standard of correctness.  Second, this matter is 
connected to the concept of pluralism.  If pluralism is true, then collective decision-making 
cannot be applied to some political disagreements.  More surprisingly, pluralism may rule out the 
applicability of social choice theory, as well. 
 
 
Resolving disagreement is both a central challenge for our politics and one of its greatest gifts.  It 
is rare that a policy commands anything like consensus; different special interest groups have 
different desires; and the elements of government compete among themselves for limited 
resources.  Yet contemporary political systems push through: Decisions get made, even though 
some parties are left dissatisfied and uncertainty lingers over whether the decisions were the right 
                                                             
1 I thank Jesse Hill for helpful discussions on the matters discussed in this chapter. 
 2 
ones or not.  (The U.S. Congress is a salient and worrying exception, a result of Republican 
obdurance.) 
 Perhaps it would be nice if there were no disagreement at all, so that government could 
concentrate on efficiently implementing the unambiguous will of its people.  But there is no 
prospect of that happening (and it is not clear, from the point-of-view of good decision-making, 
that eliminating disagreement is desirable).  So we grapple with a question of both theoretical 
and practical importance: How should our politics deal with disagreement over policies, 
candidates, and the like? 
 I consider this question here.  In particular, I consider what, exactly, we hope to 
accomplish by resolving political disagreement.  Our aim cannot simply be to ensure that a 
decision gets made, as that would legitimate obviously problematic systems of decision-making.  
We could, always and everywhere, obey the preferences of the oldest, white, male voter.  But 
that seems wrong.  It seems wrong, first, because it seems unfair—the preferences of other voters 
ought to count for something, too—and it seems wrong because no one person possesses the 
competences and character necessary to make good decisions across contexts.  And the quality of 
our decision-making matters, morally. 
These are the two normative frameworks within which disagreement and decision-
making are analyzed.  The first framework is that of social choice.  In some cases, whether 
disagreement gets resolved in a morally correct way turns on how those who disagree are treated 
by the process: Did everyone have an opportunity to air his opinion about the matter at dispute?  
Were votes fairly tabulated?  Or did the opinions of some people count for more, or for less, on 
account of (e.g.) their race or gender? 
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An example: A group of friends is deciding where to go to dinner.  Each member of the 
group has a different restaurant preference.  The moral challenge facing this group is to extract 
from these diverse individual preferences a single, group preference which represents, in some 
sense, the “will of the people”.  In situations of social choice, a morally correct decision-making 
process treats individuals involved in the process fairly. 
The second normative framework is that of collective decision-making.2  In these cases, 
an important end hangs in the balance, and the moral concern is whether the decision-making 
process is likely to achieve this end or not. 
Imagine a group of doctors debating whether treatment plan a or plan b will save the life 
of their patient (suppose that they know that one and only one of these plans will do this).  The 
doctors have different opinions about which plan will work, different levels of ability, different 
knowledge of the patient and the treatments, and so on.  But, in contrast to the restaurant case, 
they share a common preference—they all want to save their patient’s life.  Here, the morality of 
their decision-making turns on whether they do this effectively.  So long as the process is an 
effective one for getting at the truth about the correct treatment plan, no doctor has a legitimate 
moral complaint.  The way his personal preference had or had not influenced the process is of no 
intrinsic moral relevance.  
Which framework is appropriate for politics?  When we make decisions about candidates, 
economic policies, whether to go to war or not, whether to permit or proscribe abortion, and so 
on, should we be guided by a desire to treat citizens fairly or to get the decision right?  Is there a 
                                                             
2 Although I will use these terms consistently in this chapter, I note that usage in the literature 
varies; terms like “social choice”, “collective decision-making”, and “social welfare function” 
mean different things to different authors, and so it is important to check definitions. 
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single answer to this question?  Or are there contexts in which both considerations apply?  If 
there are, how should the two be balanced?   
Political theorists have devoted insufficient attention to these questions, which are 
fundamental ones, underlying debates about political legitimacy and the merits of expert rule, 
among other things.  For example, there is lively dispute between scholars who defend 
democracy on the basis of its procedural value—how it treats voters—and those who think that 
democracy should be preferred on epistemic grounds—because it is a good, maybe optimal, way 
to make decisions.3  But this debate seeks to first resolve the procedural versus epistemic 
question a priori and then to impose the relevant framework on our politics.  I suggest that we do 
the reverse: analyze real-world political disagreement and thereby gain insight into the 
appropriate theoretical framework. 
These questions are also underexplored in the economics literature.  Here is how Shmuel 
Nitzan and Jacob Paroush—two pioneers in the theory of collective decision-making—describe 
the state of things: 
Which of the two juristic systems is socially preferable, a randomly selected group of 
jurors who possess diverse preferences as well as a variety of social norms or a team of 
professional judges who share a common goal of seeking the truth?  Obviously, this 
dilemma has important applications, but as far as we know, there is neither an answer to 
this question nor even a theoretical framework within which the question can be 
analyzed. (2017: 501) 
 
My goal in this chapter is to take some steps toward addressing these lacunae. 
 I proceed as follows: In §1, I give an overview of the formal frameworks of social choice 
theory and collective decision-making.  In §2, I consider the core questions raised above.  I 
                                                             
3 In the former, procedural camp one finds, e.g., Dahl (1979) and Schumpeter (1950).  The latter, 
epistemic camp includes Dietrich and Spiekermann (2013), Goodin (2003 and 2008), and 
Landemore (2013).  And then there are hybrid theorists, like Estlund (2008). 
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conclude that most, perhaps all, political disputes concern matters which citizens believe, if 
implicitly, to have objectively correct and incorrect resolutions.  Politics appears to be a matter 
for collective-decision making, not social choice.  I then turn, in §3, to the seemingly disparate 
debate over pluralism.  If pluralism is true, as I believe it to be (see Mulligan 2015), then in some 
political contexts there is no single good to pursue and nothing to optimize.  Although the social 
choice framework would seem appropriate for those contexts, pluralism threatens it, too.  I offer 
some final thoughts in §4. 
 
1. Models of Social Choice and Collective Decision-making 
I begin by summarizing the theoretical frameworks used to analyze situations of social choice 
and collective decision-making.  Although the two frameworks have some superficial 
similarities, they are quite different, as we shall see.   
In common are (1) a set of voters {v1, v2, . . ., vn} (these could literally be voters, or 
members of a policy committee, or friends debating where to go to dinner, etc.)  Each voter has 
(2) a preference ordering over the various alternatives {a1, a2, . . ., am} at issue (candidates, 
policy options, restaurants, etc.)  The goal of both frameworks is (3) to select a social welfare 
function (SWF), which extracts a single, group preference ordering from the n individual 
preference orderings. 
 In social choice theory, an axiomatic approach is used to select the SWF: We identify the 
constraints that we believe are required by “fairness” or “reasonableness” to yield a set of 
conforming SWFs.  For example, one common axiom is known as No Dictators: It would be 
unfair and unreasonable if our SWF parroted the preferences of one voter.  Note that this is a 
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weak constraint: Given an electorate of 300 million voters, a SWF that flat-out ignores the 
opinions of 299,999,998 of them still satisfies No Dictators. 
The most important, and surprising, discovery of social choice theory is that it does not 
take many axioms, nor implausible ones, to reduce the number of conforming SWFs to zero.  
This is Kenneth Arrow’s (1950) celebrated Impossibility Theorem: For m ≥ 3, no SWF satisfies 
three plausible axioms: 
  
(1) No Dictators; 
(2) Unanimity (if all voters prefer ax over ay, then the group preference ordering 
should prefer ax over ay); and  
(3) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (whether the group preference 
ordering prefers ax over ay should only depend on how voters rank ax and ay—
what they think of az shouldn’t matter). 
 
The ramifications of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem for politics remains a matter of debate.  The 
claim, sometimes made, that it shows democratic decision-making to be inevitably unfair 
(because any real-world system, to include democratic systems, must violate one of these 
requirements) is too quick, not least because elections involving only two candidates (i.e. m = 2) 
are not imperiled.4  What is appropriate to say is that for many real-world decision-making 
processes, there is a strong but not conclusive Arrovian case to be made that there is unfairness 
in the process. 
                                                             
4 For a defense of democratic decision-making against Arrow’s result, see Mackie 2003. 
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 An importance difference between models of social choice and models of collective 
decision-making is that the latter assign each voter vi a competence—a probability pi that his 
preference ordering is correct.  In situations of social choice, such an assignment would make no 
sense: There is no notion of some people’s preferences being correct and others’ incorrect.  In 
addition, models of collective decision-making almost always restrict the number of alternatives 
under consideration to two (m = 2): two candidates, two policy options, two ways a referendum 
question might be answered.5 
 The core result in collective decision-making was obtained by Grofman, Owen, and Feld 
(1983) and Nitzan and Paroush (1982): Given some assumptions,6 the optimal SWF is to weight 
voter vi’s preference in proportion to log $%&'$% , and then apply majority rule. 
 Consider the medical scenario, above.  A critical feature of this scenario, and one which 
distinguishes it from social choice scenarios, is that the members of this decision-making body 
(the “voters”) share a common goal: They all want to save the patient’s life.  What they disagree 
about is which treatment plan, a or b, will do this. 
Suppose that v1 and v2 are medical residents, each with a 70% chance of choosing the 
correct treatment plan (p1 = p2 = 0.70).  The third doctor, v3, is an experienced specialist with an 
85% chance of choosing the correct plan (p3 = 0.85).   
The optimal way for the doctors to make this decision—to decide between a and b—is to 
weight v1’s and v2’s preferences in proportion to log (.*&'(.* = 0.847, and v3’s preference in 
                                                             
5 An exception is Ben-Yashar and Paroush 2001. 
6 Most notably, the assumption that votes are statistically independent.  The model has been 
extended to cover the relaxation of this assumption; see Berend and Sapir 2007, Berg 1993 and 
1996, Boland 1989, Boland, Proschan, and Tong 1989, Ladha 1992, 1993, and 1995, Nitzan and 
Paroush 1985, Peleg and Zamir 2012, and Shapley and Grofman 1984. 
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proportion to log (.01
&'(.01
= 1.73.  Notice that in this case, the preferences of the two junior 
doctors fail to outweigh v3’s preference (since 0.847 + 0.847 < 1.73).  Therefore, in making this 
decision, the group should ignore the opinions of the two junior doctors.  That maximizes the 
probability that the correct plan is chosen, and, thus, that the patient’s life is saved.  For this set 
of competences, expert rule—listening only to v3—is the optimal SWF.  Complaints by v1 or v2 
that they are not being treated fairly (i.e. that their votes count for nothing) would indicate both 
irrationality—since these doctors’ stated goal is to save the patient’s life—and immorality—
since any adjustments to the process in the name of fairness work against the patient, to whom 
the doctors have a duty of care. 
 Any set of competences defines a unique, optimal SWF.  For n = 3 there are two 
possibilities: expert rule, as above, and simple majority rule (i.e. “one person, one vote”).7  As n 
gets large, the number of possibly optimal SWFs grows—but the optimal SWF is always well-
defined and always straightforward to identify. 
 A comment on the importance of the number of alternatives under consideration by the 
group (i.e. the value of m).  Many real-world cases of decision-making, including political 
decision-making, are naturally dichotomous (m = 2): American voters select the Democrat or the 
Republican; a Federal Reserve committee raises interest rates or it does not; the President 
approves a CIA operation against a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, or he denies the 
operation.  
                                                             
7 For n = 3, expert rule is to be preferred over simple majority rule iff for the most competent 
voter, v3, log $4&'$4 > log
$5
&'$5




 In addition, some cases involving many alternatives can be dealt with through a series of 
dichotomous steps.  Thus, a legislature might select one of many possible tax rates for a revenue 
bill by holding a series of up-and-down votes on amendments to an underlying bill. 
 
2. Analyzing Political Disputes 
Are our political disputes better modeled by the formalism of social choice or collective 
decision-making?  In this section, I offer some suggestions for answering this question by 
examining particular cases of political disagreement. 
If real-world disagreement consists in clashes of incommensurable preferences, none 
with a claim to objective correctness, then the morally important feature of our politics will be 
ensuring that voters are treated fairly.  In practice, this means that we will likely endorse 
democracy (although see Brennan 2011 and 2016 for a dissenting view).  If, in contrast, we 
believe that there are right answers and wrong answers to our political questions, then the 
principal moral consideration will be epistemic quality.  And the case for democracy will be 
weaker. 
First, let us consider those political disputes that seem to obviously involve conflicting 
preferences.  Suppose, for example, that a municipal government earmarks $10 million for 
cultural purposes.  Residents of the city are divided between using these funds to renovate the 
public libraries or to establish a ballet company.  At first blush, it seems there is no fiducial 
standard of correctness against which these two worthy alternatives may be weighed.  (While it 
is possible that some aesthetic tastes are depraved, and thus objectively wrong, that does not 
seem to be the case here.) 
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Or suppose, even less controversially, that a newly-formed country is establishing a road 
network and debating whether to have drivers use the left side of the road or the right side.  They 
put the matter to a vote.  How could there be an correct answer to this question?  What might 
make us think that there is a moral feature to the dispute beyond ensuring that voters are treated 
fairly? 
In fact, these examples belie difficult issues.  Consider the first example, and imagine that 
an alderman makes the following argument: “Some people want the ballet and some people want 
the library.  We all agree that aesthetic preferences for ballet and literature are equally legitimate.  
We’re never going to resolve things that way.  So let’s figure out which project will make our 
city a happier place and choose that.”  In this way, the alderman asks voters to (1) recognize the 
fact of disagreement, (2) accept that there is no first-order answer to the debate, and (3) seek to 
identify another goal, which might command consensus or something close to it, to resolve the 
matter. 
If we find such an approach plausible, we have moved out of the realm of social choice 
and into the realm of collective decision-making.  Now one of the two alternatives is correct—
namely, the welfare-maximizing one.  This alternative might be selected under a social choice 
approach, but it might not.  If ballet brings more pleasure to its fans than the library brings to 
bookworms, then the “fair” preference aggregation method—plausibly, simple majority rule—
might select the library, not the ballet, despite a consensus on welfare-maximization which 
demands the latter.  
Or consider the second example, above.  There is evidence (Leeming 1969) that driving 
on the left leads to fewer accidents than driving on the right.  Given that, could voters still resist 
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the idea that there is no correct answer to the question of which side of the road they should 
choose? 
To be sure, justifications for right-side driving might be given: Maybe long-standing 
practice should be respected.  Maybe the new roads should be easy for right-side-driving tourists 
to navigate.  But if justifications are being given in this way—if we are offered reasons for 
thinking that safety is not in fact the controlling value—then we are again being asked to make a 
judgment about the correctness of the conclusions our arguments are pointed toward. 
Next, consider a salient political debate, which is an hotly-contested one in the United 
States.  This is the debate over whether we should mobilize to fight climate change.  This 
mobilization could include new economic regulations, leading to a loss of output, as well as a 
reallocation of public and private spending from unambiguously worthy causes (e.g. 
humanitarian relief) to environmental protection. 
We might again be tempted to say that this is a matter for social choice, since it is a 
debate over the sort of society we prefer to live in—one in which output is X and we fund public 
education (or the military, or humanitarian aid, or whatever), versus one in which output is Y and 
we spend some of our scarce funds to fight climate change. 
But that is not correct.  Both sides of this debate agree about something important—if 
climate change is happening, then we ought to take steps to fight it.  Those opposed to 
environmental regulation and a tax on carbon think that these are bad policies because they are 
skeptics about climate change itself.  With climate change, we have an empirical dispute which 
masquerades as a matter of conflicting preferences.  But if it’s an empirical dispute, then 
somebody’s right and somebody’s wrong; either climate change is happening or it is not.  Again, 
considerations of social choice are misplaced.  And it would seem that some people—namely, 
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scientists—are more likely to answer the climate change question correctly than the ignorant are.  
If that is so, then we have reason to endorse an “unfair” decision-making process (e.g. one which 
does not allow the average voter to weigh in on climate change policy) in the name of epistemic 
quality.8 
To be sure, the debate is more complicated than that.  People disagree about the existence 
of climate change, but believers disagree among themselves: about the extent to which climate 
change threatens our economic livelihood; our moral duties to future generations; the appropriate 
discount rate to use in today’s policy decisions; etc. 
 But this does not establish that there is no right answer to the question of whether we 
should fight climate change.  It only suggests that this question is a complicated one.  And 
grappling with inaccuracy is precisely what our collective decision-making processes are 
designed to do.  Imperfections in voters’ abilities to get to the truth about these questions will 
reveal themselves in the quality of our political outcomes.  The right response to discovering 
such imperfections is not to abandon the process; it is to be aware of our epistemic limitations 
and to try to improve outcomes by improving competence. 
While applying the collective decision-making framework requires consensus about a 
goal, the goal may be a very “thin” one.  Despite widespread disagreement over rights, utility, 
liberty, and myriad empirical facts about our world, do we not all agree that the just climate 
change policy ought to be chosen?  So long as we can reach consensus on some fiducial 
standard—such as the establishment of justice—we share the necessary common goal.  Even a 
thin consensus, like the pursuit of justice, suffices to show that these disputes are not clashes 
                                                             
8 See Kappel 2017 for a discussion of the ramifications of these fact-dependent policy disputes 
for political legitimacy. 
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between preferences, but collective searches for truth. 
Consider one more example: the debate over abortion.  Here it is hard to interpret the 
debate as one of clashing preferences.  Abortion is as hotly-contested as it is because people are 
driven by strong moral sentiments about the objective rightness or wrongness of killing a fetus.  
It does not help to resist this by arguing that public policy cannot be purely determined by the 
demands of morality but must also be shaped by attention to citizens’ preferences.  For example, 
we might concede the immorality of abortion but yet still think that a just society permits it if it 
is sufficiently desired by its citizens.  If that is true, it simply pushes the collective decision 
problem up one level: Instead of asking, “Is abortion morally wrong or not?”, we ask, “Given 
some accepted fact about the morality of abortion, and the degree to which it is supported (or 
opposed), should it be permitted in our society?”  That is a normative question which has a right 
and a wrong answer.  
Suppose that God were to come down and deliver the True Principles of Morality to us, 
and we thus learned that abortion is immoral.  What would we think of a person who, despite this 
knowledge, continued to agitate for the permissibility of abortion in society?  Is there any way in 
which she could be exculpated for her conduct, for promoting a political view which she knew to 
be wrong?  I do not see how. 
While this might seem like a trivial point, there is in fact an interesting and subtle 
consequence of admitting that political questions like these are truth-apt.  This is that a rational 
voter might both (1) judge that X is the correct policy within some domain, and (2) endorse a 
decision-making procedure which she believes is likely to select Y rather than X. 
Imagine a voter, Sally, who forms a belief about the moral permissibility of abortion in 
an epistemically optimal way: She surveys the evidence in detail; she works to free herself from 
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bias; and she takes care to scrutinize the various arguments on offer.  She may even modify her 
own belief in light of what she knows about the beliefs of others (this possibility is considered in 
the literature on the epistemology of disagreement).9  In any case, let’s stipulate that, given the 
evidence available to her, Sally has arrived at a maximally justified belief about abortion, and 
has concluded X. 
Now Sally may act in one of two ways, politically.  First, she may try to maximize the 
probability that the abortion policy corresponding with her view—X—obtains. 
But this would be irrational. Sally understands that collective decision-making has 
epistemic power.  Therefore, she should accede to a political process that can more effectively 
get at the truth of the abortion question than she alone can.  This is true even if Sally believes that 
the process is likely to select Y and not X.  For example, if the government offers Sally the ability 
to choose, by fiat, the abortion policy that society will live under—in lieu of majority rule—a 
rational Sally will turn this power down.  And she will turn it down even if she believes that by 
doing so there is a greater probability that Y, which is by her lights the wrong policy, will obtain. 
Sally has done the best that she can to arrive at the truth about the morality of abortion; 
she believes it is X, others believe that it is Y.  But the question of what moral belief she is 
maximally justified in adopting is different from the question of what political decision-making 
process is most likely to implement the correct policy.  And Sally’s moral responsibility, vis-à-
vis that second question, is to comport herself so that the system that is most likely to choose the 
correct policy, whatever that happens to be, is established. 
Now, one might think that such a demand is tantamount to asking Sally to violate her 
conscience.  It is, but that is not a problem.  If actions were legitimate so long as those taking 
                                                             
9 The best introduction to disagreement is Feldman 2007. 
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them believed that they were doing the right thing, many of history’s worst moral monsters 
would be exonerated.  That you believe that what you are doing is right does not justify you in 
your action.10 
Nor is following one’s conscience a necessary condition for acting morally, as explained.  
Or consider vaccine skeptics: people who believe, against the scientific consensus, that vaccines 
do not prevent disease and may even be harmful.  Some people are vaccine skeptics because they 
are willfully stupid, or because they propagandize themselves on the Internet, or because they 
have not devoted sufficient time to studying the issue—or for other blameworthy reasons.  But 
surely not all skeptics are like this; surely some are intelligent and careful people who have 
simply arrived at (what we believe to be) the wrong conclusion about vaccine safety. 
Now suppose that one of these skeptics is considering now what to believe but how to 
act: She is considering whether to vaccinate her child or not.  If her goal is maximizing the 
welfare of her child, as it ought to be, then she will vaccinate her child.  Why?  Because she 
recognizes the epistemic value of the de facto collective decision-making process that has 
already taken place: The investigation of vaccine safety by expert scientists, and the consensus 
they have reached.  If this parent is rational, and if she seeks to act in the best interest of her 
child, she will subordinate her own judgment to the judgment of the collective for the purpose of 
action—even as she believes the collective’s judgment to be wrong. 
None of this requires that the parent change her mind about vaccine safety, or that she 
refrain from trying to persuade others that her skeptical view is the right one.  The point is that 
one cannot move from (1) P believes that X is the right thing to do in domain D, to (2) P ought to 
try to establish, politically, X in D.  That does not follow.  P’s moral responsibility is to act in 
                                                             
10 On the moral (ir)relevance of conscience, see Foot 2002 and Schueler 2007. 
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such a way that maximizes the probability that the correct alternative in D, whatever it happens 
to be, obtains.  
Two final notes.  First, I have advanced theoretical reasons for believing that politics is a 
matter for collective decision-making.  There are empirical reasons as well.  It is well-known 
from experimental economics that people are not single-minded self-interest seekers,11 and 
political science research tells us that the same is true when it comes to voting: Citizens do not 
vote with an eye toward maximizing their own advantage but select the policies, candidates, etc. 
that they believe are in the interest of their country at-large.  Citizens vote, that is, 
“sociotropically”.12  This suggests that there is a common goal which voters pursue.  
Second, there may be formal ways to reduce scenarios of social choice to collective 
decision-making.  Even in scenarios of social choice, there is a sense in which there is a best 
preference ordering: It is the “fair” preference ordering, the one that would be selected by a 
properly constrained social welfare function—whatever that happens to be.  In this way, 
individual preference orderings can be regarded as noisy judgments about this objectively correct 
preference ordering (Conitzer and Sandholm 2005). 
 
3.  The Relevance of Pluralism 
The concept of moral pluralism (sometimes, “value pluralism”) has three elements: (1) There are 
multiple, irreducible, incommensurable moral goods; (2) these goods sometimes come into 
conflict in the real world (in the sense that pursuing one requires foregoing another); and (3) 
there is no rational way to resolve these conflicts.  For the pluralist, moral loss is inescapable. 
                                                             
11 This line of research began with Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwartze (1982). 
12 Kinder and Kiewiet (1979 and 1981). 
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 Although the idea of pluralism is most commonly credited to Isaiah Berlin, it was in fact 
first elaborated by Sterling Lamprecht (1920 and 1921), four decades earlier.  Lamprecht gives 
the example of a military commander who, in deploying his forces, must choose between 
protecting a cultural treasure—the cathedral at Chartres—or saving the lives of some of his 
soldiers.  For the pluralist, there is no right answer: Human life is a genuine moral good, sublime 
art is a genuine moral good, and there is no “correct” solution to the commander’s dilemma.  
This stands in contrast to the views of most normative theorists.  The utilitarian, for example, 
reduces the value of the cathedral, and of the soldiers, to the happiness they now possess or will 
create.  And in that way, the utilitarian provides, at least in principle, unambiguous guidance to 
the commander.  For the pluralist, no such guidance can possibly be given, because no such 
reduction of value is possible. 
By definition, disputes between plural values cannot be resolved with the collective 
decision-making framework.  That framework only applies when there is agreement about the 
right goal; and a consensus goal is precisely what the pluralist denies.  As Robert Talisse puts it, 
pluralism must countenance “no fault” moral disagreement: two parties may hold 
opposing judgments on a moral question, and yet it could be that neither is wrong. . . .  
Certain moral disagreements are “no fault” not because of some lack of objectivity about 
value judgments but rather because it is a fact about certain judgments that they correctly 
identify and properly estimate the significance of certain objective goods, which are 
incommensurate with other such goods. (2012: 22) 
 
That is straightforward enough.  What is surprising is that the social choice framework 
may also be unhelpful.  There are two reasons for this.  First, the pluralist’s principle (3) tells us 
that there is no rational way to resolve conflicts between incommensurable goods (“when a 
moral dispute is due to a conflict between heterogeneous goods, there is no uniquely rational 
resolution to the dispute.” (Talisse 2012: 22)).  Much of social choice theory is devoted to 
providing precisely such a resolution. 
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Second, social choice is normative: We believe that we should obtain a group preference 
ordering in such-and-such a way because that way has moral value (typically, because it is fair).  
But if that is true, then the fair group alternative is just one more morally good thing, to stand 
beside the moral goods of the alternatives themselves.  And pluralism would suggest that it has 
no claim of superiority over them.  What, then, does the social choice framework get us?  Does it 
not introduce one more way for our world to produce moral loss? 
Perhaps the moral value of fair aggregation is of a different order than the values of the 
individual alternatives we seek to aggregate.  That is, perhaps we could both (1) agree with the 
pluralist that there is no standard measure against which the value of the cathedral and the value 
of the soldiers’ lives may be measured, and (2) say that new, better, second-order value is created 
when we treat those tasked with this decision fairly.  The first-order moral loss associated with 
whatever choice we make is a terrible one, but some good may come of it—if we structure our 
choice in the appropriate way. 
In sum, for disagreements which concern plural values, the framework of collective 
decision-making is clearly misplaced.  The framework of social choice would seem appropriate 
for modelling these disagreements, but its application leads to problems, described above.   
Some of these problems disappear with more precise definitions: Is the “rational” 
resolution to value conflicts which pluralism denies equivalent to the “rational” constraints we 
seek to put on our SWFs?  If not, then pluralism will not threaten the social choice approach.   
Other problems are deeper.  For example, does the pluralist maintain that normative value 
simpliciter is incommensurable?  Or only a subset of this value?  If the latter, then it may be 
possible to make claims about the superiority or inferiority of second-order, political decision-
making processes while denying the possibility of similar claims at the first-order level. 
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Finally, we might wonder to what extent the political disputes considered in §2 are 
instances of pluralism in action.  Disputes over climate change, at least as described—in which 
they are disputes about an underlying empirical thesis—are not.  But perhaps claims about 
whether to build a library or fund a ballet company are—and if that is the case, then satisfying 
resolutions at the first order level may not be possible. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
The issues raised in this chapter will, I believe, command increasing attention in coming years.  
Brexit, the Colombian people’s (initial) rejection of peace with the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia after decades of war, and the election of Donald Trump are all political events 
which are arguably upright in the social choice sense (since they were results of fair, democratic, 
political processes) but morally dubious in the collective decision-making sense (since they are, 
or will lead to, objectively bad outcomes). 
 But assigning value or disvalue to these events requires that we first determine what our 
politics are all about.  I have argued that much of politics is a collective search for truth, and if 
that is so then recent events should indeed unsettle us.  
 We are in a better position to answer Nitzan and Paroush’s question, “which of the two 
juristic systems is socially preferable, a randomly selected group of jurors who possess diverse 
preferences as well as a variety of social norms or a team of professional judges who share a 
common goal of seeking the truth?”  The answer is the latter.  Often we can agree on an 
objective standard of correctness, and if so then we are obliged to arrange our decision-making 
process to best serve that objective.  The standard may be a thin one, such as “justice” (with no 
further definition given for that term).  But no matter how thin the standard, if it is endorsed by 
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all those who participate, then all must defer to that process, whatever the implications for their 
own, personal preferences. 
 To be sure, there will be vigorous debate over exactly what is meant by “justice”.  Is 
justice in a criminal trial convicting defendants who more likely than not committed the crime?  
Or does justice require, as we typically think it does, a burden of proof above and beyond this?  
But again, this dispute is not one of conflicting preferences; it is a dispute about the proper 
“thick” definition of “justice”. 
 All that said, as discussed in §3, the possibility of pluralism raises problems for 
addressing politics through collective decision-making.  Pluralism provides richness in our 
culture while creating challenges for our politics.  This is well-known.  What is surprising is that 
perhaps there is a similar dichotomy at work in our theory, as well. 
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